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HOLD ON TIGHTER/LET GO SOONER:

A REVIEW OF FREE CULTURE AND AN
ARGUMENT FOR THE SYNTHESIS OF PUBLIC
DOMAIN PRESERVATION AND MORAL
RIGHTS ADOPTION
I. INTRODUCTION

Copyright protection in the United States is based on the
Constitutional mandate "to promote the progress of science and the
useful arts" and requires that authors be granted "the exclusive
right to their respective writings" for a limited amount of time.'
By its design, copyright is a means of granting limited monopolies
(both in terms of duration and scope) to copyright owners, with the
anticipated economic gains from those monopolies serving as
incentives to creators.2 The incentives lead to creation, and society
is culturally enriched as a result. Therefore, copyright in the
United States is fundamentally an economic right, because the
limited monopoly of copyright is created to facilitate economic
remuneration for the creator's service of contributing to society's
cultural well?
In his latest book, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses
Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control
Creativity, Stanford University law professor Lawrence Lessig
argues that copyright protections have changed for the worse since
the time of the framers. Copyrights as they exist in America

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK,
COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 212 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter DREYFUSS &
KWALL].
3. E.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
429 (1984). Copyright "is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors
and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive
control has expired." Id.
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today, Lessig argues, are a bloated version of what the framers
envisioned.4 Perverted by the best influence that money can buy,
the argument continues, Congress and the courts have facilitated
this expansion and, in the process, have done immeasurable harm
to society by reducing the amount of material that enters the public
domain and the amount of material that is freely available for use
by other creators.' Supporters of this view are identified as the
"copy left," and, like Lessig, argue for narrower, shorter copyright
protection in place of the current system of, they claim, broad and
nearly interminable copyright protection.6 If the copy left were a
political party running for office, then Free Culture could serve as
its platform. And Lessig, who represented Eric Eldred before the
Supreme Court in an ultimately unsuccessful challenge to the
constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA"),
might well be chosen to head up the ticket.7
The United States, of course, is by no means the only-nor was

4.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL

CREATIVITY 131 (2004) [hereinafter LESSIG].
5. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 214-18.
6. The ideology that underlies the copy left movement developed out of
the open source software movement of the 1960s, when programmers and
hackers began to swap the codes that make computer software function.
Programmers would take a code, improve it, and then pass it along-at no
cost-to other programmers in order to continue the process of evolution.
Richard Stallman was one of the early proponents of the idea of open source
software and in 1985 formed the Free Software Foundation. That foundation
was a means of promoting the General Public License system that Stallman had
created, which was a license agreement that put in writing what had long been
the central idea of hacker culture: software should be free and continually
improved
upon.
See
http://www.openknowledge.org/writing/opensource/scb/brief-open-source-history.html, (last visited Nov. 4, 2004). The idea
of open knowledge eventually began to appeal to those, like Lessig, who
thought the copyright system in the United States had moved from the realm of
sensible protection into a vastly overreaching, and therefore no longer societally
beneficial, system of law. "Indeed, as I reread Stallman's own work.. .I realize
that all of the theoretical insights [in Free Culture] are insights Stallman
described decades ago." LESSIG, supra note 4, at xv.
7. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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it remotely the first-country to protect authors' creative output
within the rubric of intellectual property. And as might be
expected, other countries approach copyright protections
differently than the United States. Throughout much of the world,
and particularly across continental Europe, the moral rights of
authors 8 are protected in addition to and independently from the
economic rights of copyright holders.9 Moral rights are somewhat
amorphous and appear in different guises in different countries,
but generally protect such things as the author's rights of
disclosure, attribution, and integrity in the work that he or she has
created.1" "The rights spring from a belief that an artist in the
process of creation injects his spirit into the work and that the
artist's personality, as well as the integrity of the work, should
therefore be protected and preserved."" Moral rights are not nonexistent in the United States, though their scope is quite small in
comparison to the protections offered elsewhere in the world. 2
The Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA"), which Congress enacted
8. The term "authors" as used here, and throughout this Comment,
encompasses the spectrum of creators and does not refer exclusively to writers.
9. See generally Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral
Right: Is an American MarriagePossible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985). In the
European paradigm, if the author is the copyright holder, then both moral and
economic fights vest in the same person. But even if an author sells her
copyrights, she retains her moral rights protections because moral rights attach
to the author and are not alienable. Id.
10. DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 2, at 294.
11. Philip Vineyard, "No One Expects the Spanish Inquisition "--Twice:
Subduing the Moral Rights Monster, 6 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 223, 224

(2004) quoting Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d. 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995)
(citing RALPH E. LERNER AND JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW:

THE GUIDE FOR

COLLECTORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 417 (1989)).
12. Prior to the passage of VARA, in 1990, the only moral rights
protections in the U.S. were those available from state laws. Authors could
attempt to use state-based unfair competition, defamation, privacy, publicity,
and contract causes of action in response to a perceived violation of their moral
rights. VARA has preempted those state laws where they overlap, but in areas
not protected by VARA, the state laws still offer protection. ANTHONY
D'AMATO & DORIS ESTELLE LONG, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

LAW 154-58 (1997) [hereinafter D'AMATO & LONG].
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in 1990, represents the federal codification, in very limited
circumstances, of the moral rights of attribution and integrity."
VARA only protects a narrow category of visual art, and outside
that range, federal courts in the United States do not currently
recognize a violation of moral rights as a cause of action for which
relief can be granted.14
The idea of moral rights may have its supporters, but to the copy
left, moral rights represents yet another way of extending and
expanding copyright law to protect authors and creators in a way
in which the law was never intended to operate. Lessig apparently
thinks so little of moral rights that he never even mentions them in
the course of Free Culture's 300-plus pages about copyright law.
Lessig's lack of any reference to moral rights, even if simply to
repudiate them, is important because it demonstrates the extent to
which the copy left, one of the most important voices in the
copyright world today, dismisses the idea of moral rights. This
dismissal, while not particularly surprising given the minimal
copyright protection the copy left favors, is significant because it is
squarely at odds with international copyright protection practice,
including the Berne Convention. 5
13. DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 2, at 295; see also 17 U.S.C. §
106A (2004).
14. DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 2, at 356.
15. The Berne Convention, which the United States joined in 1988, is an
international copyright treaty that focuses largely on eliminating the many
formalities-such as registration and marking-that used to be a part of U.S.
copyright law. With the changes to the Copyright Act that were adopted by
Congress in 1976, the requirements for registration and marking were scrapped,
as required by the Berne Convention. Article 6bis of the convention, which was
not adopted by the United States, calls for a recognition of moral rights:
Article 6bis
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after
the transfer or the said rights, the author shall have the right to
claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion,
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action
in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation.
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In this Comment, I argue that Lessig's approach, while in many
ways sensible, is flawed because he ignores moral rights. I
contend that implementing some of Lessig's ideas-for example,
reducing the duration of copyright protection and requiring some
sort of registration-make sense and would be a positive step for
United States copyright law. But I also argue that moral rights can
and should be added to the bundle of copyright protections
because of the benefits they offer to both authors and society. In
Part II of this Comment, I will review the major arguments of
Lessig's Free Culture, including an examination of the legal and
historical traditions that Lessig says support his ideas. In Part III, I
will introduce and explain the foundational principles of moral
rights as they exist in this country and, more extensively, abroad.
Finally, in Part IV, I propose a new direction for copyright,
synthesizing what I believe to be the most beneficial aspects of
both Lessig's position and the moral rights perspective. I argue
that my proposed moral rights inclusive framework could be used
to reach an equitable balance between preserving the public
domain to the greatest extent possible and honoring the rights of
authors that inure in works upon creation.
II. INTRODUCTION To FREE CULTURE
Lawrence Lessig begins Free Culture, his persuasive and wellwritten argument for a stronger public domain via a roll-back in
copyright protections, with a story. Prior to the creation of
airplanes, rights in real property (that is, land) had been conceived
as extending above the land and into the sky. 6 After the Wright
Brothers invented the airplane, this understanding of the law
The rights granted to the author in accordance with the
preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at
least until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be
exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the
legislation of the country where protection is claimed..
Available at www.law.comell.edu/treaties/beme/6bis.html (last visited March

15, 2005).
16.

LESSIG, supra note 4, at 1.
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presented an obvious problem for the soon-to-be created
commercial air travel industry: pilots (or air carriers) would either
have to violate the property rights attached to every piece of land
they flew over (and face possible suit from all of them,
individually or collectively), or they would have to try and get
clearance from every land owner in order to avoid running afoul of
property law.
Companies are, with good reason, generally
reluctant to pursue a business model that relies upon repeated
violations of the law, so the former option was not palatable. And
the transaction costs associated with trying to get clearance from
every property owner in the United States would also be onerous,
to say the least, which rendered that option (if it ever really was
one) moot. There was, of course, one other possibility: change the
law. That change came from a somewhat unlikely source after a
husband and wife team of North Carolina chicken farmers, the
Causbys, sued the federal government because low-flying military
aircraft, flying out of a local municipal airport leased by the
federal government, were apparently causing the death of their
chickens.' The case wound up before the United States Supreme
Court, where Justice William 0. Douglas rendered an opinion that,
as Lessig puts it, "[i]n a single paragraph [erased] hundreds of
years of property law." 8 In that landmark decision, Douglas
ridiculed the idea that property rights extend infinitely into the
skies and would subject every flight to a trespass suit by the land
owners. 9 "Common sense revolts at the idea," Douglas wrote.2"
Lessig's reason for relating the story of the Causbys and their
doomed chickens is not difficult to decipher: a new technology
(the airplane) challenged the existing order of property law, and
the law adapted to the changed environment in such a way as to
impede the new technology as little as possible. That is not to say
that the law will bend itself around every new creation: the pet
rock craze of the mid-1970s did not create a "rock rights"
movement. But even if commercial air travel was not as common
17.

United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).

18.

LESSIG, supra note 4, at 2.

19.
20.

Causby, 328 U.S. at 261.
Id.
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then as it is today, the transformative power of the airplane was
well understood by 1946, when Douglas penned the Causby
decision. Airplanes had, after all, enabled the delivery of Little
Boy and Fat Man, leveling much of Hiroshima and Nagasaki under
atomic clouds and ending the war in the Pacific, the year before
the Causby decision was handed down."
The history behind Causby, however, begs the question, or
questions: what would have happened to the technology that drove
advances in air travel if the Supreme Court had upheld the
Causbys' property rights to the skies above their farm? More to
the point, what would have happened to air travel if the Supreme
Court had refused to use the foresight necessary to see the
importance of air travel and had, instead, upheld the old concept of
property rather than adjusting the law to allow new technology to
flourish? These related questions are at the heart of Lessig's work,
though his concerns, of course, lie with the impact of the law on
the Internet and digital technology, not airplanes.
The emergence over the last two decades of the Internet and
digital technology as major dispensers of culture and media have
led society to a place much like it found itself when the airplane
began to emerge: new technologies are challenging concepts of
property rights that have, for hundreds of years, been taken for
granted. These new technologies offer the possibility of creating
and sharing cultural richness on a scale never before imaginable in
human history. And just as the airplane had its irate chicken
farmers, arguing that an outdated conception of property should be
retained to their benefit and society's loss, the Internet and digital
technology have interests aligned against them. Lessig's claim is
that these interests-corporate copyright owners such as the music
recording, motion picture, and publishing industries in particularare using copyright law in ways that were never intended in order
to impede the use and growth of technology and restrict society's
access to information. "Law plus technology plus the market now
interact to turn this historically benign regulation [copyright law]
21. See http://www.atomicmuseum.com/tour/dd2.cftn (last visited Feb. 18,

2005).
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into the most significant regulation of culture that our free society
has known."" In fact, Lessig argues, the scope and duration of
today's copyright law bears little resemblance to the protections
for a limited time originally envisioned and enshrined in the eighth
clause of Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution.23
The changes that have extended the reach of copyright law, most
of which have occurred in the last 40 years, Lessig says, have
served to shrink the public domain and society's access to
information that for generations was assumed to be free for the
taking.24 A growing portion of the information currently cloistered
behind the protective and ever-expanding wall of copyright, Lessig
further argues, is information and content that was free for the
taking under previous copyright regimes-namely, the public
domain and works that were not previously copyrighted.25
Farmers did not want airplanes buzzing their chicken coops, and
were willing to argue that their property rights should be valued
above society's interest in air travel-though the Supreme Court
ultimately refused to go along. Lessig argues that the above
cultural content industries are similarly eager to assert their
intellectual property rights-specifically their copyrights to music,
movies, and books-even at the cost of denying society access to
the full cultural richness that is possible through the use of new
technologies. 6 While the Supreme Court decided that the societal
benefits of air travel outweighed the property rights of the earthbound, the outcome of the "copyright war," as Lessig calls the
current struggle, is far less certain. Thus far, Congress has
weighed in on the side of creating and upholding extensions of
copyright law that, Lessig argues, do not serve society's interest in
promoting creativity.27 The courts have been somewhat split on
the issue-but are stuck interpreting the copyright-protective laws
22.

LESSIG,

supra note 4, at 170.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 10.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Congress, for example, passed the Copyright Term Extension Act in
1998. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2004).

23.
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passed by Congress, which limits their ability to move in the other
direction.28
Lest his arguments be easily brushed aside as too radical, Lessig
repeatedly stresses the point that he does not support the
elimination of copyright protections.29 Nor does Lessig view
commercial piracy--creating and selling bootleg copies of DVDs
or CDs, for example-with anything other than contempt.
"Despite the many justifications that are offered [to explain such
piracy], this taking is wrong," Lessig says." "No one should
condone it, and the law should stop it."'" The "free" in free
culture, he explains, does not mean content that is acquired
without payment, rather that content simply does not need to be
paid for because it is unprotected by copyright, either in the public
domain or in the large category of material that used to reside
outside the realm of copyright protection, but no longer does.32
Although not a radical or an anarchist, Lessig is a firm believer
that copyright law has been over extended to the detriment of
society. He argued as much before the United States Supreme
Court in Eldred.33 Lessig's scholarly works and his efforts on
behalf of Eldred have placed him squarely at the center of the copy
left. And in that capacity, Free Culture can be viewed as a
manifesto for supporters of what they would call more sensibleand beneficial-copyright policy.

28. In Eldred, for example, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of copyright term extensions. Eldred, 537 U.S. 186. In
Grokster, however, the 9th Circuit chose not to extend the reasoning of Napster,
and found that the Grokster peer-to-peer file sharing service was not infringing
the plaintiffs' copyrights because it simply provided the software for sharing,
but played no part once the (potentially-infringing) sharing took place. MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and heard oral arguments in Grokster just prior to
publication of this Article.
29. LESSIG, supra note 4, at xvi.
30. Id.at62.
31. Id.at62.
32. Id.at xvi.
33. Eldred, 537 U.S. 186.
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A. Content Industriesand Copyrights: "Walt Disney creativity"
and History in Reruns
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear Eric Eldred's challenge
of the CTEA, it was inundated with briefs both supporting and
decrying the law.34 And it is not surprising that many of the briefs
filed in support of the government's position-that the CTEA was
a Constitutional exercise of Congressional power-came from the
industries that stood to gain the most from an extension of the
copyright term. AOL Time Warner and publishing giants such as
Reed Elsevier, Houghton Mifflin, and McGraw-Hill all signed
onto briefs supporting the law.35 In addition, the various groups
representing the motion picture and music recording industries,
and groups representing writers, directors, and actors also signed
onto amicus briefs.36 In Free Culture, Lessig savors the irony in
those filings because, as he argues, the history of 2 0th century
American creativity in general is one that was facilitated by liberal
amounts of borrowing from existing works, including those in the
public domain, which used to be comprised of content from the not
too distant past.37
Disney, one of the great creative forces of the 2 0 1h century,
began making movies in 1928, when the average copyright
duration was about 30 years. 3 This fact meant that almost all of
the content produced in the 19th century was available for Disney,
or anyone else, to use without charge and without needing to ask
for or receive permission.39
The advantage to such a
comparatively short copyright duration, Lessig says, is that Disney
could draw upon works that were, to some extent, still present in
peoples' minds.4" In particular, Disney made heavy use of, and
modifications to, the by-then public domain tales of the Brothers

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 231-33.
See 2002 WL 1836617; see also 2002 WL 1822122.
See 2002 WL 1836636.
LESSIG, supra note 4, at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
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Grimm, which many adults in society still remembered from their
childhood. 41 Lessig has a name for this type of creative process:
Walt Disney creativity, "a form of expression and genius that
builds upon the culture around us and makes it something
different. '42 Walt Disney creativity, Lessig argues, has been the
main creative catalyst behind the deep cultural well that has
developed over the course of American history.43 But recent legal
developments in response to the growth of the Internet and digital
technology have served to limit the amount of material available to
the Walt Disneys of today. The result, Lessig argues, is a society
poorer for the missed opportunities of creation made impossible by
current applications of copyright law.44
In fact, Lessig asserts, the movie, music, radio, and cable
television industries owe their existence to practices that would
today be considered piracy. 41 "If 'piracy' means using the creative
property of others without their permission... then the history of
the content industry is a history of piracy."46 The film industry
was under the thumb of Thomas Edison, who held the patents on
film making technology and closely guarded the use of that
Facing a deadline dictating that
technology by others.47
filmmakers comply with Edison's patents, a movement emerged to

41. Id. at23.
42. Id. at 24.
43. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 29. Of course, if the works of the Brothers
Grimm, or any other works that were the basis for early Disney movies, had still
been subject to copyright protection, Disney could have tried to obtain a license
from the copyright owners to use the works. But given the fact that Disney was
a young company, it is possible that it would not have been able to pay whatever
rate the copyright holders might have demanded. Similarly, the copyright
holder might have refused to license the work because it objected to a then
unknown company adapting one of its works into an animated movie. If either
of those possibilities had occurred, the genius of Disney might never have been
expressed to the world--or at least not in the same, societally-transformative
manner.
44. Id. at 221-22.
45. Id. at 53.
46. Id. at 53.
47. Id. at 53-54.
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flout the stifling patent protections. Eventually, many filmmakers
moved west, to California, where they established a film
community in Los Angeles, far beyond the reach of even Edisonand the federal government, whose agents would have enforced
Edison's patents. 8 By the time the reach of federal law
enforcement extended far enough to force the frontier filmmakers
to honor Edison's intellectual property rights, the patents had
expired. 9
Recorded music also shares something of a pirate past, Lessig
argues."
When the technology to record music-both
phonographically and on scrolls for player pianos-first became
available, composers and music publishers (who made the sheet
music that was used by live performers) decried the new
inventions as something that would steal the profits of their
intellectual property.5 Legendary composer John Phillip Sousa,
appearing before Congress, said of phonographs: "These talking
machines are going to ruin the artistic development of music in
this country," by eliminating the sing-alongs that Sousa said
helped develop young peoples' musical abilities. 2 "The vocal
chord will be eliminated by a process of evolution, as was the tail
of man when he came from the ape."53 Needless to say, the
"infernal machines," as Sousa called them, have done nothing if
not bring music to more people than could have ever experienced
it when "the dominant form of entertainment in America was
getting a talented pianist to come into your living room and pound
out some tunes while you sang along. 5 4 But that outcome was
only possible because Congress decided that composers would not
have a veto power over who got to record their songs.5 Instead,

48.

Id. at 54-55.

49.

LESSIG,

supra note 4, at 54-55.

50. Id. at 55.
51. Id. at 56.
52. Cory Doctorow, Digital Rights Management, available at
http://www.changethis.com/pdf/4.03.DRM.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Congress created a compulsory license system-something akin to
a forced sale of property-that gave composers no control over
who recorded their songs-but always guaranteed that the
composer would be paid." "If you ever wondered how Sid Vicious
talked [Paul] Anka into letting him get a crack at 'My Way,' well,
now you know."57 Lessig sums up the story well: "By limiting the
rights musicians have, by partially pirating their creative work, the
record producers, and the public benefit." 8 Securing that public
benefit is the goal of copyright law, Lessig argues, or at least it
used to be.59

One of the rights that copyright law has reserved for the owners
of copyrights in recorded music is that of controlling public
performance.6" When a radio station plays a song, however, the
artist who recorded the song is not the one who gets paid-it is the
composer of the song who is, again via a compulsory license. 6
"The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of the performer's
work without paying her anything."62 The rationale supporting this
arrangement is that the air play a song receives promotes it and
boosts album sales for the artist, which is worth more in the long
run than whatever compensation the artists might otherwise
receive under a compulsory license system.63 "But even if so, the
law ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By
making the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station
Under today's
the right to take something for nothing."'
understanding of piracy, Lessig argues, the Congressionallycreated payment scheme means that radio stations are committing

LESSIG, supra note 4, at 57.
Doctorow, supra note 52.

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 221.

60.

17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2004).

LESSIG,

supra note 4, at 58.

61. If the performer and the composer are the same person, the performer
does get paid of course - but she is paid for her composition, not for her
performance. See id.
62. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 59 (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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piracy every day.65
When cable television first began transmitting programming into
peoples' homes, the cable providers were not paying for the
content they showed.66

What was worse from the broadcast

networks' perspective, was that the cable companies were charging
customers for content not costing them anything.67 "Cable
companies were thus 'Napsterizing' broadcasters' content, but
more egregiously than anything Napster ever did-Napster never
charged for the content it enabled others to give away."68 Lessig
says that broadcasters, in demanding payment for shows for which
they had already been paid (by advertisers when the show
originally aired), were effectively trying to expand the monopoly
that they already held over the shows.69 The courts refused to go
along with this argument, twice siding with the cable companies.7"
Ultimately, Congress created a compulsory licensing system, much
like the one it created for the radio industry, through which it could
set the price that cable companies paid for content "so that the
broadcasters couldn't exercise veto power over the emerging
technologies of cable."'"
B. Pirates-Withoutthe Funny Hats: The Expanded Scope of
Copyright Protection
A few illustrative hypotheticals:
Person A makes hundreds of unauthorized copies of DVDs,
packages them similarly to the authorized versions, and then sells
them on the street in Manhattan, or Beijing. Person B prints out
the e-book that she has purchased, reads it, and then passes the

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 59-60.
68. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 59-60.
69. Id. at 60-61.
70. Id. at 61. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,
392 U.S. 390 (1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
71. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 61.
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print along to a friend. Person C, a college student, downloads a
song from an online music source without permission. Under
today's version of copyright law, all three of these people have
committed at least one type of copyright infringement. In other
words, all three are guilty of piracy. But Lessig argues that the
current understanding of piracy bears little relation to historical
understandings of the term.72 Most importantly, Lessig says, uses
that are considered piracy today would not fit within the rubric of
piracy as copyright law was understood to function throughout
most of American history.73
Of the three people above, Lessig would argue that only Person
A has committed piracy under the traditional understanding of the
term, because he made an unauthorized copy. 74 "Nothing in the
argument of this book, nor in the argument that most people make
when talking about the subject of this book, should draw this
simple point: This piracy is wrong," Lessig writes. 75 Person B,
Lessig would say, has done nothing that she could not have done
had she purchased the hard copy of the book instead of the
electronic version. 76 The restrictions placed on her use of the ebook should not differ from the restrictions placed on a paper
book-so Person B might have run afoul of the new rules imposed
by the e-book publisher, but she has violated no traditional
copyright rule.77 If Person C had been born ten or fifteen years
earlier, he would most likely have been using cassette tapes to

72.

Id. at 63.

73.

Id. at 78.

74.
75.
76.

Id. at 62.
Id. at63.
Id. at 143-44.

77. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 148. Lessig illustrates the e-book issue with
his own electronic library, which includes works both under copyright
protection and those in the public domain. As might be expected, the uses of
those works still protected by copyright are fairly strict. But the uses of the
public domain works (such as Middlemarch, by George Eliot, and Politics, by
Aristotle) are also restricted. For instance, Lessig was not allowed to print or
copy any of his electronic copy of Politics, despite the fact that the book was

written 2,000 years ago. Id. at 148-50.
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make recordings of records." In other words, he would have been
home-taping, a practice that the courts have ruled acceptable and
non-infringing.79 Again, Lessig would argue that the ascendance of
digital technology should not mean the addition of restrictions
upon what has traditionally been considered an acceptable use for
copyrighted material.8 "
Lessig's point here is simple: piracy was once defined by
copyright law-which defined it relatively narrowly. But now,
piracy is often defined as much by content delivery mechanisms as
by copyright law. With the advent of the Internet and digital
technology, copyright owners have done two things. First, they
have built technological barriers-referred to in the collective as
digital right management ("DRM")-into the delivery mechanisms
for music, movies and other types of media that limit how users
can access and use content.8 ' So, for instance, the e-book that
Person B purchased might well have included a prohibition on
printing more than a few pages at one time, or it might have
indicated that printing the book at all would violate the license
agreement and, therefore, the e-book's copyright. Lessig argues,
however, that there is nothing inherent in copyright law dictating
that printing an e-book is copyright infringement. 2 Rather, the ebook publishers decided that, in an effort to limit the sharing of
their products, they would create an internal limitation-via
DRM--on how content is used that can be enforced through

78. Certainly, not all of the tapes people once made of legally purchased
records were for personal use - some were undoubtedly given to friends or
traded for tapes of albums the taper might not himself own. Nevertheless, the
recording industry has thrived. The same argument can be made with respect to
digital music recording in that some people will only use digital "copies" for
home use (such as transferring a CD to a digital file on their computer), while
others will surely trade these digital files in the same manner that people used to
trade tapes. The only real difference between the two is the potential magnitude
of the sharing, which is much greater for digital music files.
79. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 446.
80.
81.
82.

LESSIG, supra note 4, at 143-44.
Id.
Id. at 151.
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copyright law.83
The problem here, Lessig notes, is that DRM has the same
impact as copyright laws: it restricts the manner in which the
public can use creative material.84 Laws are made by legislators,
however, and if they pass legislation that is wildly unpopularsay, a bill that banned the sharing of digital music files via the
Internet-the public can attempt to vote them out of office. But
software manufacturers, music and movie studios, and book
publishers do not have to answer to the public, only to their
stockholders.
"[W]hile it is understandable for industries
threatened with new technologies that change the way they do
business to look to the government for protection, it is the special
duty of policy makers to guarantee that that protection not become
a deterrent to progress."85
The second step content providers have taken, Lessig argues, is
to mold existing copyright law to fit their new conception of what
constitutes piracy.86 Accordingly, Congress passed the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act in 1998, amending the Copyright Act
to include prohibitions on circumventing the DRM encoded in
digital files.87 Affecting this change in the law was necessary
because e-book publishers, for example, could have included all
the DRM in their products that they wanted to. However, without
a law in place making it illegal to traffic in materials that can be
83. Id. at 144.
84. Id. at 144.
85. Id. at 128.
86. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 157.
87. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)-(b) (2005); Section 1201(a)(1) makes it illegal
to circumvent DRM in order to gain access to material that the offender would
not otherwise be authorized to access. Section 1201(a)(2) makes it illegal to
traffic in materials that allow a person to violate §1201(a)(1). Section 1201(b)
is a bit different, however, because it only addresses the trafficking in material
that facilitates circumventing DRM to allow an individual more access then
authorized (as opposed to §1201(a)(2), which addresses facilitating access
where no access authorization exists at all). Section 1201(b) does not address
the use of such prohibited materials, however, because to do so would severely
limit the availability of a fair use defense. See also DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra
note 2, at 478.
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used to circumvent DRM, courtesy of members of Congress who
are well-funded by the copyright owners, the prohibitions would
have carried no weight. And a rule that carries no penalty for
transgressions is not a rule that is likely to be followed very
closely, if at all.
Lessig's argument is that a law that forces people to choose
between not having full access to the content they purchase on the
one hand and committing a felony to get that access on the other is
not indicative of a system of copyright laws that is functioning in
the best interest of society.88 In fact, Lessig argues, the existence
of such a "Hobson's Choice" is perhaps the best evidence that
copyright law as it exists today is in serious need of repair.
DVDs present a non-hypothetical example illustrating how
technology is expanding the scope of copyright law. DVDs
contain a "region-code" that identifies the market for which they
were manufactured and where they were sold.89 DVD players are
all enabled to read the various region codes on DVDs, and are
programmed only to play DVDs with a region code that matches
the one programmed into the DVD player.9" The consequence is
that if a person bought a DVD in the United States and then took it
on vacation to France, he would not be able to view the DVD on a
French DVD player. "Remember: there is no copyright that says
that an author gets to do this. When we wrote the copyright
statutes and granted authors the right to control display,
performance, duplication, derivative works, and so forth, we didn't
leave out 'geography' by accident."91 This case illustrates
precisely the type of expansion of copyright that Lessig decries: in
the past, the first-sale doctrine permitted people to dispose of
copyrighted material nearly however they wanted once they had
bought it.92 However, given recent shift in copyright policy, that is
not always possible.
DVDs provide another illustrative example of the expanded
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

LESSIG, supra note 4, at 202.
Doctorow, supra note 52.
Id.
Id.
LESSIG, supra note 4, at 146.
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scope of current copyright law, one that Cory Doctorow related in
a speech before Microsoft employees in June 2004. 93 A woman
bought a DVD of the movie "Toy Story" for her children. But
rather than give the fairly expensive DVD to her children who
might, "given the generally jam-smeared character of everything
the kids get their paws on," 94 ruin it, she decided to make a VHS
copy of the DVD. Her reasoning seems logical; blank VHS tapes
are inexpensive and if the children ruin one copy, she could simply
make another. Her plan would have worked except that DVD
players and VHS recorders are legally required to have installed a
DRM system called Macrovision. 95 Macrovision "messes with the
vertical blanking interval in the signal and causes any tape made in
this fashion to fail."9 6 As Doctorow points out, the woman here is

"the proverbial honest user. She's not making a copy for the next
door neighbors.. .She's doing something 'honest'-moving it
from one format to another. She's home taping."97 And, as Lessig
would point out, home taping is not copyright infringement-and
should not now be considered as such simply because the
technology underlying the taping has become more advanced. 98
But in order for the woman to overcome the DRM on her DVD
and VHS, she would have to risk committing a felony.
Doctorow points out that the use of DRM in the above example
might ultimately be self-defeating for the copyright owner.9 9 If the
woman ever finds out about peer to peer networks like Kazaa, he
says, "the next time she wants to get a movie for the kids, she'll
download it from the new and burn it for them."' '
In that
scenario, the film industry would make no money, as opposed to at
least reaping the benefit from her initial DVD purchase.
Regardless of whether one supports this expansion in copyright
93. Doctorow, supra note 52.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 69.
99. Doctorow, supra note 52.
100. Id.
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law, it is indisputable that it is indeed new. Books are certainly
heavily regulated by copyright law, but the same person who was
not able to play his American-bought DVD in a French friend's
DVD player could bring a whole suitcase full of American-bought
books with him to France without breaking any copyright laws.
And once he was finished reading those books, he could distribute
them for free or for money without running afoul of copyright
laws.' 0
The DVD examples above do differ from the book example in
one important respect, the magnitude of potential infringement. A
commercial pirate can make thousands of unauthorized copies of a
DVD fairly easily and inexpensively because of recent advances in
technology." 2 But even an ambitious book pirate would be less
likely to create thousands of copies of a book because printing
books is still a fairly cumbersome and expensive proposition-and
not one that can reasonably be conducted from a home, as opposed
to DVD piracy, which can be achieved on a large scale using a few
computers in one room.
Lessig does not directly address this point in Free Culture, but
would presumably argue that a balancing evaluation must be
undertaken to examine the potential damage to copyright holders
because of wide-spread infringement, versus the damage caused to
society by limiting the public's access to content. And, given his
general argument in Free Culture, Lessig would, at least
reflexively, be likely to come out on the side of access. However,
the counter argument is not without merit because the new ability
to rip a movie onto a hard drive and then post it for free on the
Internet vastly increases the scale of possible infringement. As
faster, more reliable broadband Internet connections become the
101. The is an expression of the first-sale doctrine: "The rule that a
copyright owner, after conveying the title to a particular copy of a protected
work, loses the exclusive right to sell that copy and therefore cannot interfere
with later sales or distributions by the new owner." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
285 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).
102. Studios Help Thwart DVD Piracy Ring, August 14, 2003, available
at http://news.com.com/2100-1026_3-5064197.html?tag=fd-top (last visited
Feb. 18, 2005).
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norm in the United States, and a larger number of people rely on
the Internet for movies and music, the risk from this type of
infringement will increase.
Already, the emergence of the Apple iTunes on-line store has
created an interesting complication for Lessig's idea. When
someone steals a CD from a music store, that music store has one
less record to sell, Lessig explains, and thus has been deprived of
its right to sell its property." 3 But when someone downloads a
song from a peer to peer ("p2p") network like Napster, before it
was shut down,"°4 or like Grokster, °5 Lessig maintains, the
downloader has not deprived the artist or the record company of
anything-there is not one less CD to sell, and thus no piracy." 6
Therefore, Lessig concludes, the person taking an unauthorized
digital copy of a song from the Internet is not committing
anywhere near as severe an offense as the music store shoplifter. 7
In fact, Lessig argues that in many cases the downloader is not
committing an offense at all.'0 8
Lessig's argument, however, is based on a concept of stealing
that is rooted in physical property-one less CD in a store is one
less CD to sell. But, given the advent of iTunes, which has sold
more than 150 song downloads thus far, 0 9 and other Web sites that
will inevitably follow and facilitate legal music downloads,
Lessig's purely physical property-based analysis appears flawed.
In Lessig's framework, the unauthorized download is not illegal
because it did not deny the copyright owner the ability to sell her
goods " ° In fact, Lessig argues, many people who download a
103. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 64.
104. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
105. Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154.
106. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 64.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 66.
109. iTunes Music Store Downloads Top 150 Million Songs, Oct. 15,
2004, available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2004/oct/14itunes.html (last
visited March 15, 2005). Apple says that it is selling 4 million song downloads
each week, which put it on pace for selling more than 200 million downloads
annually. Id.
110. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 64.
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song for free and without authorization do so to see if they like it,
and if they do, then purchase the entire CD."' In that scenario,
Lessig says, unauthorized downloads can actually help sell CDs."2
Apple's iTunes however, changes the equation, because the
"product" that iTunes sells never exists in physical space as a CD
does. The product is never anything more than a digital file, first
on Apple's server and then on the hard drives and iPods of Apple's
customers. If an individual downloads a song from a p2p network
for free, however, it is reasonable to assume that person is very
unlikely to then log onto iTunes and download the same song
legally for free.
Lessig's argument makes some sense when comparing the
unauthorized downloading of individual songs versus purchasing
entire albums because the individual songs can be said to whet a
consumer's appetite for the entire CD. When the scenario is
reduced to single song downloading, however, the scales must tip
in the other direction. Granted, an unauthorized download of a
Bruce Springsteen song from Kazaa does not remove the digital
copy of that song from the iTunes server (which would be the
equivalent of stealing a physical CD from a music store). But the
effect is exactly the same-iTunes will sell one less legal
download of that Springsteen song because people are not likely to
pay for what they have already gotten for free.
At the heart of Lessig's argument in Free Culture is the idea that
new technology should be protected from the existing, entrenched
technology, and that the law, while maintaining consistency,
should also accommodate new technology." 3 Given the paradigm
shift that digital technology has caused in copyright law, Lessig's
argument is weakened because he chooses to rely on a definition
of stealing that is so heavily based on physical property. People are
simply not going to pay to download a song that they already
obtained for free from another source any more than they are going
to buy a CD at one music store if they have already stolen it from

111.
112.
113.

Id. at 68.
Id.
Id. at 77-78.
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another. There is nothing that can be physically stolen from
iTunes, but the exact same effect-iTunes selling one less songis achieved by unauthorized downloading.
C. The Duration Question: How Long, How Long Can We Protect
This Song?".4
The Constitution specifically states that copyright protection is
to be for a "limited time."1 5 Lessig argues that over the course of
the last several decades, however, American copyright law has
been edging more towards a perpetual copyright." 6 The various
expansions of copyright duration that Congress has approved now
mean that the copyright protection of a work created by an
individual author on any given day after January 1, 1978, lasts for
7
the life of that author plus 70 years."

Let us assume for the sake of illustration that an author is 30
years old in 2004 when she publishes a book. The average life
expectancy for an American woman in 2000 was 79.5 years. "8
Assuming that number is still accurate, or at least has not
decreased, that book would not enter the public domain until
2123-unless, of course, Congress created other copyright
extensions in the meantime. This is a stark contrast to the duration
of copyright protection in the early 20th century, when Disney was
first making movies. At that time, copyrights generally lasted
about 30 years." 9 So, if the 1909 law was still in effect, and had
never been extended, that same book published in 2004 would
most likely enter the public domain in about 2035, nearly 90 years
sooner than under current copyright law.
Lessig sees two problems with this trend in extended copyright
duration-one legal and the other societal. First, Lessig argues
114.

115.
116.
117.
118.

Author's apologies to U2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
LESSIG, supra note 4, at 134-35.

17 U.S.C. § 302 (2004).
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services available at

http://www.mchb.hrsa.gov/whusa02/Page-26.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
119. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 24.
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that the various copyright extensions Congress has enacted are
unconstitutional because they run counter to the language in the
Constitution requiring that copyrights be issued only for a limited
term. 2 ' This was one of the arguments Lessig presented to the
Supreme Court when he represented Eric Eldred. 2 ' In Free
Culture, Lessig states this argument plainly: "[I]f Congress has the
power to extend existing terms, then the Constitution's
requirement that terms be 'limited' will have no practical effect. If
every time a copyright is about to expire, Congress has the power
to extend its term, then Congress can achieve what the
Constitution plainly forbids .. '""
In addition to this Constitutional harm, Lessig also argues that
extensions are bad for society because they cause the public
domain to stagnate.'
The point of having a public domain, he
says, is to enable people to access accumulated cultural wealthonce the law is done rewarding authors, it rewards the public by
giving it free access. 24 But with a book produced today by a 30
year old author not reaching the public domain until at least 2123,
the public domain will quickly dry up with nothing new being
added to it.
According to Lessig, most copyrightable work that is created has
value.125

no commercial

And most of the work that is

commercially valuable only retains that value for a short period of
time. 26 So, in reality, copyright law exists to protect the interests
of a "tiny fraction" of all creative works, even though copyright
applies to every work that fits within the definition set out in the
Copyright Act, regardless of whether the author has any interest in
such protection.

27

The societal harm from extended copyright terms is evident,
120.

Id. at 228.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 215.
Id. at 215-16.
Id. at214.
Id. at 221.
LESSIG, supra note 4, at 225.

126.

Id.

127.

Id.
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Lessig says, when the proper balance is reached between the rights
of those holding commercially valuable copyrights and society's
interest in free access to the vast majority of material that is not
commercially valuable. 2 Lessig argues that society's interests
must win in this scenario because the advancement of culture
29
depends on people's ability to use works that have come before.'
And when hardly any works have entered the public domain over
the last 40 years-including works that have no commercial
value-society is losing.'3
In addition, Lessig notes, works that lose their commercial value
but are still copyright protected are often nearly impossible for
people to obtain. 3 ' This is true because the copyright owner may
not even know that she owns the copyright. But it is also true
because corporate copyright owners tend to only release material
that will make them money-and long-forgotten films are not
likely to initiate the flow of much revenue.1 2 So instead, the
owners simply ignore a huge quantity of material that is copyright
protected, but has no commercial value. 33 The result, Lessig
argues, is that much cultural content is lost forever because it is
simply unavailable and, especially in the case of film and recorded
music, the source materials might even become unusable. 34
Society, in other words, is poorer because commercially valueless
works are sequestered behind the doors of copyright law:

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 172.
Id.
Id. at 173.
LESSIG, supra note 4, at 221.
Id. at 224.
Id.
Id. at 225.
By the time the copyright on [films that were made in the
early 2 0 th century] expires, the film will have expired. These
films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and nitrate stock
dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
canisters in which they are now stored will be filled with
nothing more than dust.
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Now that technology enables us to rebuild the
library of Alexandria, the law gets in the way. And
it doesn't get in the way for any useful copyright
purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable
the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we
are talking about culture after it has lived its
commercial life. In this context, copyright is
serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an
engine of free expression. It is a brake. 35

D. Rip, Mix, Burn: Lessig's Revised Copyright Concept
As critical as Lessig is of the current copyright regime and what
he sees as a system that is failing at its primary Constitutionally
mandated objective-promoting art and science for the betterment
of society-Lessig does not argue for scrapping copyright. Instead,
he argues for fixing the system and, at the end of Free Culture, he
offers several proposals to achieve that goal.
First, Lessig argues for more formalities-namely, copyright
registration and marking requirements.'36 The main reason Lessig
advocates a registry is so that authors who wish to use an existing
work will have a means of discovering who owns the copyright.'37
"Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what, or with
whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the creative
work of others. There are no records, there is no system of tracethere is no simple way to know how to get permission."' 3 s The
practical consequence of this lack of a registry is that a filmmaker,
for example, who wants to make a documentary about silent
Hollywood movies using clips from some of those movies has two
135.
136.

Id. at 227 (emphasis provided).
LESSIG, supra note 4, at 288. NOTE: This idea runs counter to the

Bere Convention, one of the primary goals of which was to eliminate such
formalities. See Berne Convention excerpt, supra note 15.
137. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 288.
138. Id.
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choices: He can either spend huge amounts of time and money
searching for the copyright owners in order to secure permission,
or he can simply ignore the copyrights and make the film using the
clips. Lessig illustrates the problem with the first strategy through
the story of Alex Alben, who endeavored to create a documentary
CD-Rom of Clint Eastwood's movie career, including clips from
some of the fifty or so films in Eastwood's catalogue.139 Alben
was eventually able to secure all of the necessary copyright
clearances, but only after a year of work and many thousands of
dollars. 40 Alben worked for Starwave, Inc., a software company
that was founded by Microsoft co-founder and multi-billionaire
Paul Allen."' Needless to say, Alben's pockets were deeper by far
than most. 42 The average filmmaker does not have the kind of
time or the amount of money needed to properly secure the rights
to use film clips, which means that he is only left with the second
option - using copyrighted material with out permission.
However, not securing rights at all is also not palatable because it
exposes the filmmaker to severe penalties for copyright
infringement. And that risk can often make it impossible for a
filmmaker to find a venue in which to release his film, because
distributors are not willing to risk becoming entangled in potential
copyright suits.'43 A central copyright registry, Lessig says,
similar to the one currently used to catalogue Web pages on the
Internet, would eliminate this problem and allow more people the
chance to build upon older works.'"
If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the
most difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be
removed. It would be simple to identify what content is
presumptively free; it would be simple to identify who controls the
rights for a particular kind of content; it would be simple to assert
139.

Id. at 100.

140.
141.
142.

Id. at 102.
Id. at 100.
Id.
LESSIG, supra note 4 at 98 (quoting communication from Jon Else,

143.
filmmaker).

144.

Id. at 289.
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those rights, and to renew that assertion at the appropriate time.'45
With respect to marking works-requiring the inclusion of a
-- Lessig argues that the old standard of forfeiture for failure to
mark was too severe, "akin to imposing the death penalty for a
parking ticket in the world of creative rights."'46 But Lessig is
convinced that a marking requirement does serve an important
purpose and should be reinstated, but with modifications.' 47 For
instance, Lessig argues that any work not marked should be
presumed to be free for use, unless and until the author of the
unmarked work asserts her rights to it.'48 This scheme, Lessig
says, "would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to
mark their work."' 49
The second change to copyright law Lessig proposes is to
shorten the duration of protection. 5 ° At present, an individual
author retains copyright protection for his lifetime plus seventy
years, and a corporate copyright owner receives protection for 95
years from the date of publication..' "The term should be as long
as necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer."' 52 Shorter
copyright terms would facilitate maintaining the bright line
between the public domain and protected works, Lessig argues,
because "there is little need to build exceptions into copyright
when the term is kept short."' 53 Maintaining that line, he argues,
would make using older works less complicated, which would aid
creativity."' Copyrights should also be renewable, Lessig says.'55
145. Id. at 291.
146. Id. at 290.
147. Id. at 290-91.
148. Id. at 290. Lessig admits "there would be a complication with
derivative works that I have not solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives
creates a more complicated system than is justified by the marginal incentive it
creates." LESSIG, supra note 4, at 329 n.2.
149. Id. at 291.
150. Id. at 292.

151.

17 U.S.C. §§ 302-03 (2004).

152.

LESSIG, supra note 4, at 292.

153.

Id.

154.
155.

Id.
Id. at 293.
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"This need not be an onerous burden," Lessig says of renewal,
"but there is no reason this monopoly protection has to be granted
for free."'56 Requiring renewal would also help bring more
material into the public domain, Lessig argues, because at least
some owners of non-commercially valuable copyrighted material
would allow their copyrights to lapse.'5 7 Lessig further argues that
copyright protection must only be prospective. "'
If copyright
terms were too short in the past and did not provide sufficient
incentive to artists creating at that time, Lessig says, then
lengthening those terms now will not achieve anything.'59 "No
matter what we do today, we will not increase the number of artists
who wrote in 1923. "16°
Finally, Lessig argues that derivative rights should be curtailed
because the Constitution does not mention derivative works, but
only the original writings of an author. 61 "I think it's time to
recognize that there are airplanes' in this field and the
expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of
time that a copyright runs.' 1 62 If derivative rights must exist,
Lessig argues, they should be short relative to the copyright
duration because, although the "derivative right could be important
in inducing creativity; it is not important long after the creative
work is done.' 63 In addition, Lessig says, the scope of derivative
rights should be reduced because the current system stifles
creativity."6 "Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
machines. That's what this general requirement of permission

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.at 135.
LESSIG, supra note 4, at 293.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 294.
Id.
Id.at 295.

164.

LESSIG,

supra note 4, at 295.
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'

III. THE MORAL (RIGHTS) OF THE STORY
Copyright protects the economic interests of authors as an
incentive to creation, with society reaping the benefits of richer,
more diverse cultural output. 66 Moral rights, on the other hand,
are closely tied to the author, with the societal benefit at more of a
distance.'67 These rights protect something that is more personal,
more intimate than economic rewards.'68 "Moral rights safeguard
personal and reputational rights, which permit authors to defend
both the integrity of their works and the use of their names." 69
Certainly, disregard for moral rights can have an adverse economic
impact on an author, as when a work is terribly mistranslated to the
discredit of the original author by potentially harming the author's
future opportunities for publication. But despite the possibility of
economic consequences, moral rights are based on the protection
of an author's personal stake in her creations and are independent
from copyrights.'70
There are three main moral rights: disclosure, paternity, and
integrity. 7 ' In addition, there are several other rights sometimes

included in the penumbra of moral rights: the right of withdrawal,
the right to prevent excess criticism, and the right to prevent
assaults upon an author's personality.'
The right of disclosure
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.

171.

Id.

DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 2, at 293-94.

Id. at 294.
Kwall, supra note 9.
www.infotoday.com/it/jan02/ardito.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 2, at 294.

172. Kwall, supra note 9, at 5. These lesser moral rights are problematic,
particularly with respect to the interplay between them and the free speech
clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The rights to
prevent excess criticism of a work and prevent personal attacks on an author, for
instance, run squarely into the First Amendment because they would force the
government into the position of silencing an author's critics. Others of these
secondary moral rights, specifically the right of withdrawal, do not so much run
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gives the author exclusive control over whether and how a work is
released.'73 "Underlying this component of the moral right is the
idea that the creator, as the sole judge of when a work is ready for
public dissemination, is the only one who can possess any rights in
17 4
an unpublished work."'
The right of paternity is the right to attribution and protects the
author's interest in being properly credited for her work.'75 "[T]he
right of paternity safeguards a creator's right to compel recognition
for his work and prevents others from naming anyone else as the
creator."' 76 In addition, the right of paternity also protects authors
from having their name attached to a work authored by another.'77
Finally, the right of integrity protects against "[a]ny distortion
that
misrepresents
an artist's
expression."' 78
Such
misrepresentation varies in intensity from the extreme of
mutilation (figurative, as in a translation, or literal, as in destroying
a sculpture or painting), to less radical changes to a work, such as
unauthorized modifications. '
In the United States, moral rights are only enshrined for a small,
distinct group of works-specifically limited edition or unique
works of fine visual art protected via VARA. 80 While VARA
represents the first explicit steps toward moral rights recognition
and protection in the United States, some criticize VARA for not
going far enough in protecting authors' rights:

afoul of the Constitution as they do principles of business. The right of
withdrawal allows an author to recall a work if, for instance, he no longer
believe in its message. Granting this right to authors in the United States would
mean granting authors the right to force a publishing company to recall an entire
print run of a book because the author had a change of heart. See DREYFUSS &
KWALL, supra note 2, at 357-58.
173. Id.at 5.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 294.
176. Id.at 7.
177. Id.
178. DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 2, at 8.
179. D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 12, at 137.
180. DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 2, at 295.
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VARA affords artists whose works fall within the
rather restrictive definition of 'works of visual art' a
kind of private Landmarks law to preserve their
works. But real moral rights do more than that; they
protect not only against alteration of the original
physical object, but also against distortion of
representations of the art image. 8 '
The first application of VARA occurred in the 1994 case Carter
v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., where an artist sued the lessor of a
building who wanted to remove a sculptural work the plaintiff had
installed in the lobby of the defendant's building.'82 There, the
Second Circuit elected to protect Carter's work by ruling that it
was not functional, despite its integration into the floor, walls, and
ceiling of the space.'83 Despite the fact that Carter did not
ultimately win his case, because the court ruled his sculpture to be
work for hire and therefore outside the realm of VARA, the case
was important because it represented the beginning of the
incursion of explicitly stated moral rights in the federal courts, as
opposed to the prior, more back-door
protections sometimes
84
sought through the Lanham Act.1
Standing in contrast to the moral rights protections of the United
States, which are very limited with respect to scope, is France.' 85
181. Jane C. Ginsberg, Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital)Age in the
United States?, 19 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 9, 10-11 (2001) (internal
citations omitted).
182. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995). They did,
however, rule that the piece was a work for hire, and thus not protected by
VARA. Id. at 85.
183. Id.
184. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051 (2004). The Lanham Act, which encompasses
the body of United States federal trademark law, allows for causes of action
such as false advertising and false designation of origin that those seeking to
protect their copyrighted works have occasionally utilized in the absence of
broad moral rights protections that would be more applicable if they were
available in the United States. Id.
185. While moral rights protections in the United States are minimal,
French jurists have what has been described as an "inexhaustible reverence" for

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol15/iss1/4

32

Madden: Hold on Tighter/Let Go Sooner: A Review of Free Culture and an Ar

2004]

HOLD ON TIGHTER/LET GO SOONER

Beyond protecting attribution and integrity rights, France grants
authors the right of disclosure, the right of withdrawal, and the
right to reply to criticism.'86 In addition to the broad scope of
moral rights protection in France, creators there also enjoy moral
rights "in perpetuity"' 87 and "moral rights which do not require the
author's personal will and judgment, such as modification, may be
passed by will to the author's heirs."' 88 The French conceive of
moral rights as a completely separate set of protections from
copyright, "[t]hus, in French theory, no logical inconsistency
results from protecting a creator's moral rights in perpetuity,
89
despite the limited duration of his copyright."'
IV. SQUEEZE AND RELEASE: A NEW DIRECTION FOR COPYRIGHT

Throughout this Comment, I have described the views of two of
the major voices in the current debate surrounding copyright law.
On one side are Lessig and the copy left, advocating for copyright
reform as a means of protecting the public domain and maximizing
droit moral, as moral rights are known in France, based at least partly on the
fact that the French view author's rights as "a natural right, deeply rooted in the
principles of the French Revolution from which modem French jurisprudence
emerged." D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 12, at 123-24. For an example of the
weight French courts give to moral rights, see Turner Entertainment Co. v.
Huston, 16 No. 10 ENT. L. REP. 3 (1994) for an unofficial English translation of
the decision, in French, by the Cour de Cassation, Versailles, France. In that
case, Turner, who owned the copyright to director John Huston's classic 1950
black and white film "Asphalt Jungle," colorized the film and showed it on
French television. Huston was deceased by that point, but his heirs objected to
the colorization, as had Huston while alive, and filed suit against Turner in
French court claiming a moral rights violation. The Cour de Cassation,
France's highest court, ruled that regardless of who owned the copyright in the
film, Huston was the film's author and therefore he, and his heirs, retained the
moral rights to the film. Furthermore, the court ruled that Turner's colorization
of the film violated Huston's moral rights and awarded Huston's heirs damages
of more than $100,000. Id.
186. D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 12, at 126-27.
187. Kwall, supra note 9, at 15.
188. D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 12, at 127.
189. Kwall, supra note 9, at 15.
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the creative output of authors. On the other side are those favoring
an inclusion of specific moral rights protections to supplement
current copyright protection in the United States.
Each side asserts that its view will improve the situation of
creators-and society. Lessig claims that the reforms he is in
favor of will allow more creators greater access to existing content,
thereby allowing and encouraging creators to do what they do best,
which is enrich society.1 9° For their part, moral rights advocates
argue that additional, author-centered protections will encourage
19 1
more creativity, thus achieving the same goal as the copy left.
So although the tactics of each side are diametrically separated,
they share a common ground. I argue here that it is from this
common ground that the best hope for sensible copyright policy
will spring-a policy that would protect both the public's right to
access material and the economic incentives and moral rights of
authors.
Before I make my suggestions for synthesizing Lessig's position
with the moral rights perspective, I'll offer a final few words about
Free Culture. The most significant contribution that Lessig's book
offers is the idea that today's copyright policy as it is applied is
simply not sensible. Even if one is not persuaded to agree with
Lessig's suggestions for repairing the system, it would be
extremely difficult to argue with Lessig on the shortcomings of
copyright policy as it exists today.
In Free Culture, Lessig relates the story of a college student
named Jesse Jordan, who attended Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
("RPI"), a well-respected technical college in Troy, New York.'92
Jordan built a search engine that constructed "an index of all the
files available within the RPI network," and which was an
improvement on previous, similar search engines. Jordan had
fixed a bug in previous versions of the search engine that had
190. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 8.
191.
Although supporters of moral rights seldom make the direst
argument that such a link exists between moral rights and increased creativity,
such a stance can reasonably be inferred as a desired outcome of artists having
greater control over their works.
192. Id. at 48.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol15/iss1/4

34

Madden: Hold on Tighter/Let Go Sooner: A Review of Free Culture and an Ar

HOLD ON TIGHTER/LET GO SOONER

2004]

caused computers to crash.193 Over the course of six months,
Jordan's search engine amassed an index of more than one million
files, and included "basically anything that users of the RPI
network made available in the public folder of their computer." '94
Perhaps not surprisingly, about one-quarter of the files in the index
were music files, even though Jordan "did nothing to induce
people to put music files in their public folders."' 95 Although
Jordan made no money from the search engine, the Recording
Industry Association of America ("RIAA") took offense to the
inclusion of music files in the directory and sued for damages in
the amount of $15 million.'96 The RIAA also sued three other
college students and "[i]f you add up the claims, these four
lawsuits were asking courts in the United States to award the
plaintiffs close to $100 billion-six times the total profit from the
film industry in 2001" 19 (emphasis provided).
The RIAA
demanded all of the money Jordan had saved from summer jobs in
exchange for dismissing the suit. 9 ' Facing the prospect of
extraordinarily costly litigation in an effort to prove his innocence,
Jordan eventually agreed to pay the RIAA the $12,000 that he had
saved and the case was dismissed.'99 Regardless of how staunchly
one supports copyrights, it is difficult to see how wiping out a
college student's savings-for an act devoid of injurious intentadvances the arts and sciences. And this is Lessig's point:
copyright law has gone too far and must be reigned in before more
Jesse Jordans are extorted for their life savings.
What then, to do about the copyright situation in the United
States? First, I propose that copyright terms must be limited to

193.

Id. at 49.

194.
195.

Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 50.

196. Id. at 51; see 17 U.S.C. § 505(c)(2), which allows statutory damages
in the maximum amount of $150,000 per incident of willful infringement. The
RIAA alleged 100 distinct instance of infringement. LESSIG, supra note 4, at
51.
197. Id. (internal citation omitted).
198.

Id.

199.

Id. at 52.
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some length of time far shorter than they are now. There are two
justifications for this argument. First, the inordinately long period
of time for which a work is currently protected by copyright has
left the public domain barren of new works. "[T]oday, the public
domain is presumptive only for content from before the Great
2 ' (emphasis added). Given the importance the public
Depression""
domain has played in the development of culture in the United
States, allowing it to stagnate is unacceptable if society's goal is
the creation of more art and culture.20 '
The second reason why copyright terms need to be rolled back is
that the various copyright extensions over the decades have created
a situation where copyrights are nearly interminable. And beyond
any negative impact such a policy might have-Lessig would
argue has had and is having right now-on cultural output, the
concept of never-ending copyrights violates the Constitution.
Lessig's argument on this point is extremely simple and
persuasive: if Congress has agreed to extend copyright protection
as many times as it has over the last forty years, it is only
reasonable to assume that Congress will continue this trend.20 2
Today, an author's copyright lasts for life plus seventy years, but
just a few years ago, that protection lasted for life plus fifty years.
The duration of copyright twenty years from now might very well
be life plus one hundred years, if Congress continues down the
same path. Without some mechanism to limit Congress' ability to
expand copyright terms, the Constitutional mandate for limited
terms is all but meaningless.
If copyrights are to serve as an incentive to authors, then there is
no reason why a copyright needs to continue for a fixed period
beyond the life of the author. Authors should certainly be able to
receive the economic benefit of a limited monopoly on their
works, but that monopoly should not extend beyond fifty years
from the date of creation.0 3 A fifty year term would mean that if a
200. Id. at 25.
201.
Recall, for example, that Disney drew heavily from the public
domain for many of its most successful movies. Id. at 23.
202. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 215-16.
203. For the sake of simplicity, which should be a goal of copyright

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol15/iss1/4

36

Madden: Hold on Tighter/Let Go Sooner: A Review of Free Culture and an Ar

2004]

HOLD ON TIGHTER/LET GO SOONER

thirty-year-old writes a best seller, he would own the rights to that
work until he is eighty years old-which is longer than the average
American man lives. 2' An eighteen-year-old musical phenomenon
would own the copyright (assuming that she ever owns it at all)
until she is sixty-eight years old. It seems hard to believe that a
musician would feel less incentive to create simply because her
great-great-grandchildren will not be able to reap the benefits of a
monopoly over her work? 5 And that is assuming, of course, under
the current system that her work has any commercial value more
than one hundred years in the future. As Lessig notes, very little
creative work ever has commercial value, and that which does
tends to lose it very quickly. 26 Therefore, assuring copyrights far
into the future provides economic returns to almost no works.
However, passing works into the public domain more quickly
would have a beneficial impact on society.
Next, I propose that a mandatory copyright registry be created
and maintained." 7 Registration is vital for one simple reason:
without registration, there is no mechanism for determining who
owns which copyrights. The results of no one knowing who owns
which copyright are stories like that of Alex Alben, retold in Part
II. Instead of being able to go to a central copyright repository and
conduct simple research to determine the various copyright owners
of Clint Eastwood's movies, Alben was forced to track down and
secure the permission of hundreds of people, which took over a
year. A registry would eliminate this problem.
A copyright registry would also eliminate another problem that
policy, I propose a flat fifty-year term with the understanding that there will
certainly be cases where an author dies one year or five years after a work's
creation and is therefore not alive for the bulk of the term of the copyright.
204. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 118.
205. It also seems quite unlikely that the music of Britney Spears will be
worth very much by the time she is in her sixties.
206. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 223-24.
207. This proposal does present the obvious problem of how to deal with
the United States' commitments under the Berne Convention, which did away
with such formalities as registration. I do not have a compromise to propose for
solving this problem, but that does not mean that it cannot, and should not, be
done.
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Lessig discusses in Free Culture, that of lost culture."' When a
book no longer sells many copies, publishers do not continue to
print new copies-the books go out of print and, in many cases,
become increasingly difficult to find as time goes by. However, if
one requirement of registration was that the copyright owner
deposit a copy of the protected work with the registry, this
problem could also be solved with just a minimal burden imposed
on the copyright owner.
The fifty-year term that I propose for copyright protection
should be broken in two, so that after twenty-five years a copyright
must be renewed. As Lessig discusses in Free Culture, this
process need not be complicated, time consuming, or expensive.
In short, it would not be a significant burden on those who wish to
renew. But for those whose works are not commercially valuable
after twenty-five years, many authors might choose not to bother
renewing their copyright, thereby passing the work into the public
domain. Neither group is burdened, and society is very likely to
benefit from the introduction of large amounts of work into the
public domain in a very short period of time. This is, after all, the
mechanism that allowed Disney to begin to work its magic nearly
80 years ago.
If the copyright term was ever to be reduced, especially all the
way down to fifty years, there would clearly be enormous political
fallout." 9 It is in this context, then, that I propose a full-scale
adoption of the moral rights of attribution and integrity."' The
idea is that giving authors more control over how their works are
used in the short term, when they are likely to have the most
commercial value, would compensate for shortening the duration
of the copyright term; authors would be able to hold onto their
works more tightly, but would have to let go of them sooner. If
they had their druthers, authors might well prefer a long copyright
208. See, e.g., id. at 249.
209. The furious lobbying efforts leading up to the passage of the CTEA
would surely pale in comparison to the fight that would erupt if copyright was
cut down to fifty years.
210. These are the two rights currently protected by VARA, though of
course the group of works that VARA protects is extremely limited.
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without moral rights to a shorter one with them, but they would not
have a choice if the law changed because it would apply to every
author equally. Granted, this protection would do nothing to
mollify the corporate copyright owners, but if individual authors
warmed to the idea, they might act as a political counterweight to
the corporate owners.
As with copyright protection suggested above, moral rights
protection should be sensible. While the right of integrity could be
broadly read as prohibiting any alterations to a work, such a policy
would undermine the idea of freeing creativity, which should be
central to any copyright and moral rights regime. The question of
how to handle parodies is particularly salient here. Historically,
courts have given parodies broad protection under copyright law
because parodies offer social and political commentary that courts
have found to be vital in American society. 1' A strict application
of the right of integrity could render parodies without protection,
which would necessitate a fairly narrow reading of the right of
integrity so as to preclude only those works that distort or
misrepresent an author's work.
Beyond this political reasoning, moral rights adoption is the
appropriate course of action from a policy perspective because it
would ultimately be a positive step for developing the nation's
cultural richness to its full potential. Without moral rights
protection, an author only really has control over the content and
overall "feel" of a derivative when the license is being
negotiated-which is before the derivative is ever created.2"2 Once
a copyright is licensed, the author's only real recourse, should the
licensee create a derivative work that the author finds offensive, is
211. E.g. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th
Cir. 2001) (publisher of The Wind Done Gone did not infringe copyright of
Gone With the Wind because the former was ruled a parody).

212. This is assuming that the author and licensee do not create a
contractual obligation for the licensee to gain the author's approval over the
final product. While this type of provision, or something similar, might be
possible for an author of grand stature to demand-someone like John Grisham
comes to mind-a young or unknown author who lacks clout in the industry
could never reasonably hope to include such a provision in a contract.
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to sue for breaching the scope of the license. But if authors
enjoyed moral rights protection, they could feel more assured that
any derivative they license will, at the very least, not offend the
integrity of the original work and, by extension, the original
author. This assurance, in turn, might make authors more likely to
agree to grant licenses for derivative works-which would mean
more creative output and a benefit to society."'
Given that moral rights are so tied to the author, I propose that
moral rights should die with the author. Already, several
European countries have adopted similar rules" 4, and it is sensible
for the same reason as shorter copyright durations." 5 Namely, that
an author's deep personal connection to his work is necessarily
severed by that fact that the author is no longer alive. True, the
author's heir may inherit a copyright (whatever part of the fifty
213. Of course, if an author is interested strictly in making money from a
work, then moral rights are likely to be of less importance. But for authors who
at least as concerned about their reputation and integrity as artists as they are
about money, the addition of moral rights could have a significant impact on
their decision whether to license a derivative. In a somewhat different context,
the estate of children's author Dr. Seuss filed an amicus brief in Eldred arguing
against allowing Dr. Seuss' books to enter the public domain because if the
books were public domain material, they could be used to "glorify drugs or to
create pornography." LESSIG, supra note 4, at 233, quoting Dr. Seuss brief
(note 14, p. 326). Imagine for the sake of argument that Dr. Seuss was still alive
and that moral rights protections were in place. Dr. Seuss' fears about how his
work might be used would be allayed, even if the works were in the public
domain, because Dr. Seuss' moral rights would remain intact. While those
artists who are more focused on the financial rewards of creation would likely
prefer the longest copyright term imaginable, if the law changed, they would
have no choice but to surrender some of the duration of the current copyright
term in exchange for moral rights that they might not necessarily want.
214. For example, Germany terminates moral rights 70 years after the
death of the author. D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 12, at 127. The primary
basis for this difference in the longevity of moral rights is the underlying
philosophy that supports the existence of those rights. France adopted a dualist
approach, which bifurcated rights into pecuniary copyrights and moral rights;
Germany, on the other hand, developed a unified theory "on the Kantian theory
of expressive work as an extension of the creative personality." Id.
215. For young authors, a fifty-year copyright term is likely to expire in
their lifetime.
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year term that has not expired), and would, therefore, have an
economic interest in that copyright not being maligned. But
assigning an author's moral rights to his heirs nearly removes the
distinction between copyrights, which are economically based, and
moral rights, which are based on the connection between an author
and his work. To allow for inheritable moral rights is to
acknowledge that they are really just economic rights in disguise.
V.

CONCLUSION

Even if moral rights were to be adopted, they are certainly not a
panacea. Neither are they a replacement for copyright protection
because the two exist to protect different interests. Likewise,
simply reforming copyright law to adhere more closely to a vision
like Lessig's is not enough because it ignores the concept of moral
rights altogether. Independently, both approaches would improve
copyright law by moving closer to a real balance between society's
interests and those of individual authors. Jointly, however, these
two concepts can serve to balance each other and copyright law in
general, by placing a high value on an author's ability to control
how a work is used, while simultaneously creating what would be
a rich, vibrant public domain. Put simply, synthesizing these two
concepts will yield a result that will best serve the Constitutional
mandate of copyright protection: to "promote the progress of the
useful arts and sciences. 21 6
ChristopherMadden

216.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, C1. 8.
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